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INTRODUCTION

The Bush Administration has repeatedly acted on its view
that the September 11 events justify it in taking drastic measures not only against those suspected of conspiring in the attacks, but also as concerns immigration generally. In doing so,
the government is drawing upon a long-established, but controversial doctrine giving it "plenary" (i.e., largely meta-constitutional) power to deal with immigration. This paper will focus
not so much on what the Administration has done, but rather
on recent efforts, mostly by the courts, to check the further
growth of the plenary power. As will be shown, developments
here are mixed; the legal environment surrounding the courts'
doctrinal outlook is still evolving.
By placing the question in perspective, however, it can be
seen that major historical themes are playing themselves out in
U.S. immigration law. These center upon the historical power
of the United States to deal with the problems generated by immigration in ways that are, at least partially, beyond the Constitution and relatively unconfined by principles of general
international law. Opposed to this has been the judicial response which, at least in a modern context, has attempted to
view the immigration power as operating within a broader
framework of domestic and international human rights.
The paper begins by outlining the plenary power doctrine
as developed by the courts. It then examines the Supreme
Court's revolutionary holding in Zadvydas v. Davis,' as it affects Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") detention
policies. The rights of lawful permanent residents with criminal convictions are explored both with respect to the government's policies subjecting them to detention and retrospectively
imposing on them the consequences of new legislation. The implications of recent human rights intervention by the courts are
analyzed, both as concerns the government's detention regulations and the USA PATRIOT Act. The paper also analyzes the
President's order authorizing "military commissions" to try
those who may be associated in some way with acts of terrorism
and the problems raised by Chief Immigration Judge Michael
Creppy's order mandating "secret" proceedings for certain kinds
1 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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of cases. A further segment of the paper looks briefly at the
situation of detained asylum seekers. The events of September
11 have unquestionably aggravated this situation, and (temporarily) frustrated the spirit of reform. Finally, the new policies
are evaluated in the context of the United States' historical
2
commitment to "human rights and humanitarian concerns."
II.

THE "PLENARY POWER" IN CONTEXT: ALIENS SUBJECT TO A

FINAL ORDER OF REMOVAL AND THE ISSUE OF DETENTION

The initial sections of this paper will analyze recent developments affecting the power of the government to detain noncitizens in ways which are, at least in part, beyond constitutional and human rights control. Here, the focus will be on the
growing specter of indefinite detention for aliens who, although
ordered removed, cannot be removed in practice (because, for
instance, there does not exist a repatriation agreement with the
country of nationality), and specific mandatory rules which require detention for certain criminal aliens while their hearings
3
remain pending.
The problem of indefinite detention is an old problem, not a
new one. As long ago as the 1950s, the Supreme Court set forth
its view that indefinite detention was a constitutional possibility, at least for those permanent resident aliens who were "seeking admission" - i.e., those who had absented themselves from
the United States and were now applying to reenter. In Ex rel
Mezei, 4 and decisions following it, the Supreme Court found
2 See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 101, 102 (1980) (codified as Congressional Declaration of Policies and Objectives, 8 U.S.C. § 1521
(1982)); S. Rep. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin News 141, 141.
3 Also relevant to this discussion is the plight of criminal aliens who have
been the subject of what amounts to retrospective legislation, and those
threatened with trial in "military commissions" largely as the result of their alleged involvement with acts of terrorism. See discussion infra Section IX of this
essay.
4 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). In Mezei,
a 1953 decision, the court found itself confronted with the case of a foreign national, born in Gebralter of Rumanian of Hungarian parents. Mezei went home to
visit his mother in Rumania, and was detained on his way back to the United
States by Hungarian authorities. He was stopped when he reached Ellis Island,
and his detention threatened to be indefinite since there was no State ready and
willing to accept him upon removal. Id. at 208-09.

3
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that the U.S. Constitution does not have "extra-territorial" application so as to extend protection to such aliens. 5
Such results are consistent with the long accepted doctrine
that the immigration power does not have specific constitutional foundations, resting instead on international law principles 6 - namely, the power of the United States to act as a nation
among nations in an ordered community of States. The power
to control its borders is a natural appurtenance of sovereignty, a
power which the nation must possess if it is to be regarded as a
"State" under international law. 7 The absence of a constitutional foundation for the immigration power, however, has led
the courts to view this power as not being delimited by the normal constitutional restraints.8 Immigration laws, in a sense,
evolved in a comparative constitutional vacuum. This reduced
level of constitutional control came to be known as the "plenary
power" doctrine.9
5 Id. at 214-16.
6 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609-10 (1889) (Chinese
Exclusion Case) (holding that Congress has plenary power, even in times of peace,
to exclude aliens from or to prevent their return to the United States for any
reason).
7oId. at 604.
8 Accordingly, the courts have historically held that legislation which might
otherwise be viewed as an impermissible ex post facto law (by creating new
grounds of inadmissibility applicable to prior acts of the alien, for instance, and
which could lead to an alien's removal) was not constitutionally precluded. See,
e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The United States Constitution in its Third Century:
ForeignAffairs FederalRegulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L
L. 862, 862-63 (1989). Moreover, when the Court upholds the exclusion of Chae
Chan Ping from the United States, it also holds that the statute leading to exclusion displaces an earlier treaty which would have given the alien a reentry permit.
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 600. It is thus a curious interpretation of
international law which the Court upholds: one which grants unfettered powers
while ignoring the normative standards of international law to which the sovereign would otherwise be bound. In any case, the decision rejects, so far as the
"plenary power" is concerned, the chief feature of Enlightenment political philosophy: that sovereignty is limited ("limited monarchy") and that, to be justified,
power must be based on a stated public interest and its exercise must be proportional to that interest. See generally Ming-sung Kuo, The Duality of FederalistNation-Building: Two Strains of Chinese Immigration Cases Revisited, 67 ALB. L.
REV. 27, 76-78 (2003). For a discussion of the Chinese Exclusion Case, see STEVEN
H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 13-24 (3d ed. 2002).
9 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001). See also IMMIGRATION
PROJECT OF THE NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAw AND DEFENSE

(2d ed.

1981) (chapter 6 describing grounds for deportation under Congress' plenary
powers).
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In the summer of 2001, the "plenary power" doctrine received an important judicial check. The Supreme Court rendered its revolutionary decision in Zadvydas v. Davis,10 in
which it held that aliens who had received orders of removal,
but who could not be deported to any country on account of the
absence of repatriation agreements with the home state, were
entitled to be released at the end of six months. 1 ' This ruling
sharply delimited the concept of "plenary power" as applied up
to that point. The Court noted, among other things, that the
aliens had in fact been admitted, and were not applying for admission. Zadvydas is not a constitutional decision, but is one of
statutory construction. The Court found that the result it
reached was necessary in order to avoid a grave constitutional
issue or a potential violation of general international law. 1 2
10 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Zadvydas actually entailed review
of two circuit court decisions: Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999)
and Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000). Zadvydas had been born in Germany of Lithuanian parents, and both Germany and Lithuania had refused to accept him. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 685. Ma had been born in Cambodia which has no
repatriation agreement with the United States. Id. at 685-86.
11 See Immigration and Nationality Act [hereinafter INA], §§ 241(a)(1), (6), 8
U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (2000). The Court was construing §§ 241(a) (1) and (6) which
provide for a 90 day removal period where the non-citizen becomes subject to a
final order, but with an additional unspecified period in certain cases involving
criminal aliens where the non-citizen either would not cooperate with the removal
order or would constitute a threat to the community if permitted to remain.
12 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695. This was certainly made explicit in Ma, 208
F.3d 815, a decision which was also reviewed by the Court in Zadvydas. Among
other things, the Ninth Circuit in Ma ruled:
In interpreting the statute to include a reasonable time limitation, we are
also influenced by amicus curiae Human Rights Watch's argument that
we should apply the well-established Charming Betsy rule of statutory
construction which requires that we generally construe Congressional legislation to avoid violating international law. [Id. at 829-30].
Although Congress may override international law, we do not presume
that Congress had such an intent when the statute can reasonably be reconciled with the law of nations. [Id. at 830].
On the rule of customary international law proscribing indefinite detention, see Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir.
1981):
It seems proper then to consider international law principles for notions of
fairness as to propriety of holding aliens in detention. No principle of international law is more fundamental than the concept that human beings
should be free from arbitrary imprisonment. [Id. at 1388].
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Using constitutional jurisprudence and the doctrine of proportionality, the Court opined that the six-month limit was a
"rule of reason" - one which was proportional to the showing of
State necessity and which would prevent the statute from being
unlawful as applied. 13 The Court noted that monitoring of the
alien in a half-way house while he or she continued to comply
with INS reporting requirements was a more measured way to
satisfy public interests. 14 The Court indicated that its "rule"
would be appropriate in most instances, but it specifically added
5
that it did not have a case of "terrorism" before it.1
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the Attorney General has adopted regulations that vitiate, in large measure, the
Court's remedial ruling in Zadvydas v. Davis.16 To begin with,
although the Supreme Court's decision was not exactly clear on
this point, the Attorney General's interim regulations provide
that the protections of the Zadvydas case do not apply to aliens
who are seeking admission, only to those who are actually admitted to the United States. 1 7 (An exception exists for one particular class of inadmissible aliens: those who have entered
13

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.

14 Id. at 699-702.
15 Id. at 696.

16 See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (2004) (regarding the continued detention of
aliens). Although these regulations were promulgated by the Attorney General for
enforcement by the Immigration and Naturalization Service [hereinafter INS], the
new rules will now be administered by the Department of Homeland Security
[hereinafter DHS] through the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement [hereinafter USICE]. See Stanley Mailman & Steven Yale-Loehr, Immigration Functions in the Department of Homeland Security, 8 BENDER'S IMMIGRATION
BULLETIN 663 (Apr. 15, 2003).
17 It is important to note that the Sixth Circuit has ruled that the protections
crafted in Zadvydas apply both to deportable and to inadmissible aliens. See
Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom.
Snyder v. Rosales-Garcia, 123 S. Ct. 2607 (2003). The Sixth Circuit's decision
draws upon the opinion of the dissenting justices in Zadvydas noting, among other
things, that the statutory section under analysis, INA § 241(b)(6), does not distinguish between inadmissibility and deportability. Id. at 405. See also Xi v. U.S.
I.N.S., 298 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2002) for a similar result. But see Borrero v. Aljets,
325 F.3d 1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 2003). It should be mentioned here that both the
Sixth and the Ninth Circuits would have been better served by adopting the rule of
statutory construction announced in Murray v. Charming Betsy (The Charming
Betsy Case), 6 U.S. 64 (1804) to the effect that Congress will not be presumed to
legislate in violation of customary international law. Id. at 118. Unlike the U.S.
Constitution, international law does have extraterritorial effect.
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without having been admitted or paroled.)' 8 Moreover, under
the regulations certain classes of aliens are completely exempt
from the prophylactic rules set up by the Court. These include
those who are inadmissible because of contagious diseases posing a public threat, serious adverse foreign policy consequences,
threats to national security (such as terrorism), or those individuals having a dangerous personality disorder or who have
been convicted of a crime of violence having public safety
implications. 19
The exemption of these classes from the protection of
Zadvydas is highly questionable. Zadvydas (and Ma whose case
was decided as a companion case to that of Zadvydas) had significant criminal law violations in his past which might well
have raised public safety implications. 20 The Attorney General's
adoption of an absolute preclusion of such aliens from release
counters the clear message of Zadvydas that a case-by-case
analysis be used.
Of equal magnitude, the regulations do not adopt the Supreme Court's mandate that, in most instances, a six-month period is sufficient to determine whether an alien can in fact be
removed. Instead, the rule provides for a six-month review period in which the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") examines whether removal is in fact likely within the reasonably
foreseeable future. 2 ' Furthermore, the alien's confinement may
be extended indefinitely as long as specific circumstances exist,
such as the alien's failure to comply with the removal order by
22
seeking a passport or other relevant travel documents.
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(b)(3) (2004).
19 See 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 providing for continued detention of removable aliens
on account of special circumstances.
20 These exceptions are especially questionable in light of the fact that both
Ma and Zadvydas had criminal convictions, - Zadvydas for possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute and Ma for manslaughter arising out of a gang-related
killing. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684-85. Surely when the language of the Supreme
Court is looked to (indefinite detention is justified only for a very narrow class of
particularly dangerous criminals, terrorists for instance), - the regulations would
appear on their face to be overbroad.
21 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(b)(2)(ii) (The Department has no obligation to release an
alien until it has had the opportunity during a six-month period to make its determination as to whether there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future).
22 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(e)(2). The new rule has statutory underpinnings in INA
§ 241(a)(1)(C). Nonetheless, exceptions which would have accommodated the situa18
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Because most aliens, while in confinement, find it extremely difficult to secure official documentation from their
home countries, the regulations seem far from reasonable. Furthermore, many aliens may find themselves in the position that
Ma was in: they have been admitted as refugees or granted asylum (and thus have shown a well founded fear of being persecuted in the home State), but have committed a criminal act in
the United States. As a result, the alien's refugee or asylum
23
status ends and the alien is subject to an order of removal. It
is simply unfair and unrealistic to ask aliens to seek travel documents from a State in which they fear serious harm on a discriminatory basis.
Moreover, the INS may frustrate the six-month release period by finding that the alien will likely be removed in the future, but that a final determination may take longer than six
months. The alien may counter the INS's findings by showing
that removal to the country in question has not been successful
in the past. Placing the burden on the alien in such circumstances is a marked departure from the remedial view of
Zadvydas that the INS has the burden of showing that removal
is practicable and foreseeable, and that failure to exercise the
removal power within a six-month period is an indication that
removal is not reasonably foreseeable and that the alien should
be released.
Other regulations depart from Zadvydas in more significant ways. 24 For example, the federal regulation regarding custody procedures provides that the period within which the
government may place the alien in removal proceedings (normally forty-eight hours) may be extended, in extraordinary
cases, by an "additional reasonable period of time." 25 This provision essentially reposes unfettered discretion in the DHS to
hold non-citizens on an indefinite basis while considering
whether or not to serve them with a Notice to Appear (the relevant charging document).
tions outlined in the text would have made the regulation a more reasonable exercise in rule-making and would have more clearly adopted the prevailing spirit of
the Zadvydas decision.
23 See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(a)(1).
24 See generally Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334 (Sept. 20, 2001),
amending 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d).
25 Id. The regulation raised the previous time limit which had been 24 hours.
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Notwithstanding the Attorney General's preclusive approach in his detention regulations, the federal courts initially
continued to draw upon the Zadvydas decision and to press for
limits on the plenary power doctrine. The focus of judicial attention - as shown below in Patel v. Zemski 26 and Kim v. Ziegler 27 - was Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 236(c), a
section mandating detention of non-citizens convicted of certain
crimes during the pendency of their hearings. 28 Although the
holding of these cases is clearly no longer the law in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 29 they
will be analyzed here as expressive of plausible rationales
which could well be followed by federal courts where detention
issues other than those arising under INA § 236(c) come under
review.
In Patel v. Zemski, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
found the mandatory detention provided for under INA § 236(c)
unconstitutional on due process grounds. 30 Patel had been convicted of "harboring" an alien by employing him and giving him
a place to live. 3 1 The INS contended that this was an "aggravated felony," in that it was a crime "related to alien smuggling."3 2 Patel challenged this determination by seeking a writ
of habeas corpus. 3 3 He also continued to challenge the characterization of his crime as an "aggravated felony" in related legal
34
proceedings.
The Third Circuit followed the lead of Zadvydas in holding
that once an alien is admitted constitutional protections apply. 35 The court continued to defer to the broad "plenary power"
of the government to regulate the admission of aliens, but said
that implementation of that power must be by constitutional
Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2001).
Kim v. Ziegler, 276 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2002).
See INA § 236(c) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2000)) (providing for the
mandatory detention of criminal aliens).
29 Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
30 Patel, 275 F.3d at 311-14. The types of criminal convictions mandating detention under INA § 236(c) include, inter alia, those relating to aggravated felonies. § 236(c)(1)(B).
31 Patel, 275 F.3d at 303.
32 Id. at 304.
33 Id.
26
27
28

34 Id.
35 Id.

at 307.
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means. 36 Continued detention infringed upon the alien's fundamental liberty interest of remaining free from physical restraint.3 7 That being so, the government to justify its detention
practices had to show that they were based on a definable public
interest and that such continued detentions were proportional
38
to that interest.
The INS asserted that its detention practices were necessary to prevent aliens, such as Patel, from fleeing INS jurisdiction and absconding prior to trial.3 9 The court observed that the
concerns put forward by INS were largely contradicted by their
own statistics regarding the flight patterns of aliens in Patel's
situation.40 The Third Circuit also held that Patel's flight risk
had to be determined in an individualized hearing. In Patel,we
find the key notion of proportionality between stated public purposes and the ensuing restraint as the hallmark of human
rights jurisprudence. The Patel court's holding clearly reflected
the course set by the Zadvydas decision and, for a time, it was
hoped that the courts would be operating in a new environment
of effective judicial control over the plenary power doctrine.
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar result in Kim v. Ziegler, in which it held that INA § 236(c) was unconstitutional as
applied. The Ninth Circuit declined to rule that the statute was
unconstitutional on its face in light of the fact that it applied
both to aliens who had entered the United States and those who
were still seeking admission.41 The latter class would not necessarily be protected, according to the appeals court, under the
Zadvydas rationale. 4 2 In Kim, the alien was a native and citizen
of Korea who had been admitted as an Lawful Permanent Resident ("LPR") at the age of eight. 4 3 At age eighteen, he was convicted of first degree burglary and, one year later, of "petty theft
with priors" - the latter offense constituting an aggravated felat 307-08.
37 Id. at 308.
38 Id. at 310-11.
39 Id. at 312.
40 Id. at 312 n.9 (citing I.N.S. contracted study by the Vera Institute finding
high success rates in a pilot program allowing for the supervised release of individuals in removal proceedings, including criminal aliens).
41 Kim, 276 F.3d at 527.
42 Id. at 527-28.
43 Id. at 526.
36 Id.
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custody, he was confined by
ony. 44 After his release from State
45
236(c).
§
INA
on
based
INS
the
The Ninth Circuit adopted the proportionality test advanced in Zadvydas, and followed in Patel, whereby the alien's
liberty interest is balanced with the State's interest in detention. Lawful Permanent Residents, the court ruled, have significant interests which are patently defeated by the mandatory
detention spelled out in INA § 236(c). 46 Among other things,
such aliens often have family and business concerns which
would be adversely affected by the alien being kept in confinement while awaiting a removal hearing.4 7 Not allowing the individual to wind up his or her business and family affairs would
work a disservice not only to the alien but to all of those who
depended on the alien. 48 Accordingly, the court ruled that the
INS may confine aliens prior to removal proceedings, but the
promptness to
agency must hold a bail hearing with reasonable
49
risk.
flight
a
is
alien
the
determine whether
On June 28, 2002, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
the Kim case. 50 The question addressed to the Court was
whether respondent's mandatory detention under INA § 236(c)
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, where
respondent was convicted of an aggravated felony after his admission to the United States. Oral argument was heard on the
case on January 15, 2003. In a decision of considerable scope,
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit ruling and held
that mandatory pre-trial detention does not offend the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 5 1
The Court deferred to the legislative presumption that
aliens convicted of certain types of crimes constituted flight
risks. Of precedential weight was the Court's earlier opinion in
Carlson v. Landon, in which it upheld a similar challenge to
encompassing legislative findings that members of the Communist Party constituted flight risks and should, therefore, be
44Id.
45

Id.

46

Id. at 528.
Id. at 529.

47
48

Id.

49

Id. at 531-35.

50

Demore v. Kim, 536 U.S. 956, 122 S. Ct. 2696 (2002) (mem.).

51 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1713 (2003).
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made the subject of mandatory detention. 52 Also found governing was the opinion in Reno v. Flores, in which the Court
had upheld a regulatory scheme requiring that juveniles be released only into the care of their parents, guardians, or adult
relatives.5 3 The Court also noted the findings of the Vera Institute, which determined that about 23% of aliens actually released from detention failed to appear for their immigration
54
hearings.
The Court distinguished Zadvydas on two essential
grounds. Zadvydas, the Court found, had been concerned with
indefinite detention, whereas aliens detained under INA
§ 236(c) were confined for comparatively shorter periods of
time. 55 A more salient ground for the decision was provided by
the Court's conclusion that in Kim, as opposed to Zadvydas,
there was a rational relationship between detention and removal. 56 Under INA § 236(c), detention of the alien was justified because of the likelihood of removal. No such rational
relationship was made out in Zadvydas, where the Court concluded that INA § 241(a)(6) (providing for an unspecified period
of detention) would apply irrespective of the likelihood of removal. 57 Indeed, the Court's earlier opinion in Zadvydas centered around crafting rules under which release would become
mandatory once removal appeared impossible. Hence, the required showing that there be a rational relationship between
removal and detention is one which survives Kim. It is against
this yardstick, it is submitted, that future statutory and regula58
tory regimes will be assessed.
52

Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 542 (1952).

53 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).

Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1715-16.
Id. at 1720. The Court's assessment of how long such individuals must wait
while their cases are winding towards a conclusion - a "few months at most" - was
probably highly optimistic in light of current litigation realities. Indeed, between
trial, administrative appeal, and judicial review, the process may well take up to at
least a year.
56 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 1719.
57 Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1719-22.
58 An extremely strong opinion by Justice Souter, concurring in part and dissenting in part, contends that Kim never conceded his deportability since he intended to apply for withholding of deportation under INA § 241(b)(3). The opinion
also goes on to challenge the majority's finding that Kim's detention will be of short
duration and stresses that the main thrust of Zadvydas had been the need for an
individualized determination on whether the respondent posed a threat to the
54
55
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III. Zadvydas and Kim and Issues Arising Under New
Detention Regulations and Under the USA PATRIOT Act
The Supreme Court's decision in Demore v. Kim will unquestionably have some bearing on other fresh legal developments - most notably the Attorney General's new detention
regulations5 9 and the USA PATRIOT Act. 60 As noted earlier, interim detention regulations seek to implement Zadvydas by establishing rules for determining whether a non-citizen's
removal in the near future is likely. 6 1 The rules require an initial determination by the Department of Homeland Security
("DHS") in this respect. 6 2 If removal is found to be likely, deten63
tion is to continue subject to a six-month periodic review. If
removal is found to be non-likely, the non-citizen is to be released subject to conditions which, if violated, result in the alien
being taken back into custody.64
These regulations would appear subject to the full scope of
the protections crafted in Zadvydas, and would seem relatively
unaffected by the new direction taken in Kim. Such a conclusion is particularly justified by the Kim Court's refusal to disturb the essential rationale of its earlier ruling in Zadvydas
that there be a reasonable relationship between detention and
removal for a detention policy to withstand review - at least
community or constituted a flight risk. The unreasonableness of detention in this
instance was heightened by the fact that the immigration judge had already determined that Kim was neither. See Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1719-22.
59 See Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal, 66
Fed. Reg. 56,967 (Nov. 14, 2001), amending 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i).
60 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter USA Patriot Act].
61 See 66 Fed. Reg. at 56,968.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Also as noted earlier, certain classes are held to be detainable indefinitely
irrespective of their possible removal, including non-citizens (1) having highly contagious diseases; (2) posing serious foreign policy consequences; (3) raising risks of
terrorism; and (4) who have been convicted of violent crimes or have mental conditions. These exemptions were clearly crafted with a view to the Court's finding in
Zadvydas that it was not dealing with a situation involving terrorists. Whether
these exceptions strike a legitimate balance between the need for individual determinations and the public interest concerns of detention is likely to be litigated.
Also exempt, under the regulations, are aliens who are deemed inadmissible (including "arriving aliens" and aliens who have been paroled but excluding non-citizens who have entered without inspection). See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13.
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where sweeping legislative or regulatory presumptions are
made. 6 5 Clearly covered by the new Zadvydas protections are
aliens who have been "admitted" and are thus deportable rather
than inadmissible. 6 6 Also included would be aliens who have
been granted asylum or those "admitted" in any other form of
status. 6 7 At a minimum, these non-citizens should be able to
put forward constitutional protections in connection with their
claims to release where more than minor periods of detention
are involved. In light of the fact, moreover, that the Supreme
Court has denied certiorari in Rosales-Garcia,68 a sound argument can be advanced that similar protections should be extended to inadmissible foreign nationals as well.
The Zadvydas protections will also play a major role in interpreting the scope of the USA PATRIOT Act. It must be mentioned on the salutary side that, under that statute, the
Attorney General has seven days in which to determine
whether or not to charge the alien. 69 This provision arguably
"trumps" earlier September 17, 2001 detention regulations providing for service of a charging document within a reasonable
period of time for as long as the Attorney General, in his discre70
tion, deemed appropriate.
However, the USA PATRIOT Act contains other provisions
which are highly disturbing. These include a procedure
whereby the Attorney General may "certify" that the respondent is a "terrorist" or has engaged in other activity which
threatens the national interest. 7 1 There are no clear procedures
specified in the Act as to how the Attorney General makes this
determination. The only requirement is that there must exist
reasonable cause. 72 The statute provides for habeas corpus reZadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
66 See 66 Fed. Reg. at 56,969.
65

67 Id.

See Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied
sub nom. Snyder v. Rosales-Garcia, 123 S.Ct. 2607 (2003) (holding of Zadvydas v.
Davis, that provision authorizing post-removal-period detention of removed aliens
contains implicit reasonable time limitation, applies to aliens who are removable
on grounds of inadmissibility).
69 USA Patriot Act, supra note 60, § 412(a).
70 Compare 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334 (Sept. 20, 2001), amending 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d)
(2001).
71 USA Patriot Act, supra note 60, § 412(a)
72 Id.
68
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view (to be initiated in the Supreme Court, the D.C. Court of
Appeals, or any district court otherwise having jurisdiction),
73
but an appeal may be heard only in the D.C. Court of Appeals.
Once the "terrorist" determination is made, however, the
alien may be detained indefinitely, irrespective of whether he or
she qualifies for or is granted lasting immigration relief such as
political asylum. 74 Under these conditions, detention itself must
be seen as violating the standards set down by Zadvydas, mandating that an asylee may not be removed and has the lawful
right to remain in the United States. 75 At this point, the United
States' interest in removal must be seen as non-existent or even
illegitimate. 7 6 The vagueness of the "terrorism" definition has
also raised concerns. One commentator has remarked that a
wife could be detained who threatened her husband with a
77
kitchen knife in a domestic dispute.
In the case of aliens who have received orders of removal
and who cannot be removed to another country, the Act provides that their cases are to be reviewed in six-month increments, detention being justified only where the Attorney
General shows that release of the alien would jeopardize national security "or the safety of any individual or community."7 8
The USA PATRIOT Act's detention provisions as they apply to those who have been admitted would appear constitutionally vulnerable under the principles developed in the Zadvydas
decision. Aliens who are detained despite the fact that they
have been granted relief in removal proceedings (or who have
been detained in a post-removal context without the possibility
of being expelled) based on a vague and unsupported "certification" that they are "terrorists" would seem eligible to attack this
conclusion. Under the broad doctrine of recent constitutional
jurisprudence (and international human rights jurisprudence)
the constraint of a fundamental liberty interest must be justified by a public interest, and must be proportional to that interest. It is difficult to imagine how a valid public interest can be
Id. § 412(b).
Id. § 412(a).
75 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
73

74

76

Id.

David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1026 (2002).
78 USA Patriot Act, supra note 60, § 412(a).
77
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ascertained when no clear guidelines exist in the statute defining either the criteria or the procedures under which the Attorney General arrives at the "certification" that an alien is a
"terrorist."
IV.

FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES

A case which clearly adopts the forward-looking approach
of the circuit court opinions in Patel and Kim, but deals with an

79
altogether different issue, is Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft.

The Detroit Free Press decision concerned an internal memorandum ("The Creppy Memorandum") of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review requiring that certain types of cases
("EOIR"), most notably those dealing with aliens suspected of
involvement with terrorism, be closed to the public.80 The EOIR
sought application of the secrecy order to the removal proceedings of Rabin Haddad, who was suspected of supplying funds to
terrorist organizations. 8 ' A group of newspapers sought injunctive relief, arguing that the secrecy order offended their First
Amendment right of access to Haddad's deportation proceedings.8 2 The Sixth Circuit upheld the District Court's entry of injunctive relief.8 3 The Government appealed from the injunction
arguing that the outcome of the case was governed by Kleindienst v. Mandel, a case in which admission of an alien was
barred because of his beliefs.8 4 The Sixth Circuit found Kleindienst not controlling since the present case did not involve, as
85
Kleindienst clearly did, a "substantive immigration question."
(A "substantive immigration question," for this purpose, is one
which has to do with whether the alien is admitted or acquires
status.)8 6 The Detroit Free Press court also noted that deferen79
80
81
82

Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).

Id. at 681.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 683.

83 Id.

84 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
85 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 687.
86 Id. at 685 n.6. In support of its view, the court cited the case of Wong Wing
v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), in which the Supreme Court struck down,
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, a criminal statute which rendered it punishable for a Chinese national to remain unlawfully in the United States for one
year or more. The criminal proceedings were to be conducted in an administrative
summary hearing, which the Court found offensive on due process grounds.
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tial review to "plenary power" was being eroded by the Supreme
Court in its most recent pronouncements8 7 - most critically in
its decision in Zadvydas v. Davis. Based on the foregoing, the
Sixth Circuit ruled that administrative deportation proceedings
were sufficiently similar to judicial proceedings, so that it could
apply by analogy the two-part "experience and logic" test of
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,88 which assessed the
merits of cases claiming First Amendment access rights to different government proceedings.8 9 In applying the test, the
court found that deportation proceedings had been traditionally
open to the public and that public access would enhance the
quality of deportation hearings. 90 Openness ensures that the
government does its job properly; that it does not make mistakes. 9 1 Most importantly, the court found that the Creppy
Memorandum was not carefully tailored; it did not permit the
government to advance its concerns on an individualized basis,
but required sweeping treatment of certain classes of cases
which share a perceived common element. 9 2 Thus, the Creppy
Memorandum lacked the proportionality to governmental need
which has become the hallmark of modern human rights
jurisprudence.
However it is viewed, the decision in Detroit Free Press constitutes an important victory for those who have argued that
the plenary power is subject to constitutional and human rights
controls. The application, by analogy, of Justice Brandeis' wellknown dictum that "sunlight is the most powerful of all disinfectants"9 3 was certainly a timely reminder that there are growing limits to the immigration power, and that courts will no
longer be supine where the Government fails to show proportionality between the means it has adopted and the need to
combat terrorism.
Not all courts, however, have found themselves in agreement with the rationale of the Sixth Circuit. Many recent adjudications from the federal bench give the strong sense that the
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 692.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
89 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700-05.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 704.
92 Id. at 705.
93 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 305 (1964).
87
88
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"plenary power" doctrine (at least as applied in the interests of
keeping secret immigration matters potentially involving terrorist suspects) is alive and well. In Global Relief Fund v.
O'Neil, for instance, the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of § 1702(c) of the USA PATRIOT Act which authorized the use, on an ex parte basis, of certain classified
information in proceedings involving the "freezing" of terrorist
organizations' assets. 94 And in North Jersey Media Group v.
Ashcroft, the Third Circuit held that closure of "special interest"
removal hearings involving respondents having alleged terror95
ist associations did not offend First Amendment principles.
North Jersey Media Group, in fact, reaches an opposite conclusion to that arrived at in Detroit Free Press. The case of
North Jersey Media Group involved the same government memorandum (issued by Chief immigration judge, Michael Creppy)
which essentially closed to the public certain types of removal
proceedings - namely those in which the respondent might
have knowledge of the September 11 attacks. As in the Detroit
Free Press decision, the Third Circuit in North Jersey Media
Group was asked to determine whether the two part "experience and logic" test of Richmond Newspapers extended to administrative removal proceedings .96 Extrapolating from
historical experience, the Third Circuit found that "government
proceedings," which historical practice showed to be often
closed, were to be distinguished from criminal proceedings conducted by courts, which the Supreme Court had held to be absolutely open to the media. 9 7 The Third Circuit thus rejected the
analogy between common law criminal trials and administrative removal proceedings, which had been upheld by the Sixth
Circuit in Detroit Free Press. Finally, the Third Circuit found
that, although modern removal proceedings were the heir to old
deportation proceedings, which had often been customarily
98
open to the public, such proceedings were not invariably open.
There were many instances in which they were closed. 9 9
94 Global Relief Fund v. O'Neil, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).

95 N.
nied, 123
96 N.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99

Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. deS. Ct. 2215 (2003).
Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 200.
at 208.
at 204-16.

Id.
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Determining that there was no mandatory right of access,
the court ruled that such access could exist only through "executive grace." 10 0 In this respect, the Third Circuit concluded that
the interests protected by secrecy outweighed those which
would be advanced by an open proceeding. 10 1 A highly articulate dissent remarked on the growth of the administrative State
and the dire consequences of allowing agencies to affect vital
10 2
interests in an environment governed by secrecy.
Most recently, in Center for National Security Studies v.
U.S. Department of Justice, the District of Columbia Circuit
ruled against disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA") of the names of those persons detained during an in
vestigation of the September 11 attacks. 10 3 A FOIA request had
sought a list of such detainees, including those held for immigration violations; those held as material witnesses; and the
lawyers representing the foregoing. 10 4 The District Court for
the District of Columbia had ordered disclosure of the names of
the detainees plus their attorneys but agreed to the withholding
of all other detention information. 0 5 Noting that FOIA authorized the withholding of information which would hamper "enforcement proceedings," the appeals court reversed this
judgment and ordered that the names of all detained and their
legal representatives be withheld. 10 6 In rendering this judgment, the court virtually placed its imprimatur on a variant of
the "plenary power" doctrine, ruling that it was not an abdication of the judicial function to refrain from "second guessing"
the Executive Branch in its determination of which disclosures
would, and which would not, have unfavorable implications for
national security. 10 7 On the First Amendment issue, the court
distinguished Detroit Free Press, indicating that it was dealing
not with "access to information relating to a government adjudicative process," but rather to "investigatory information."' 0 8
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.

at 215.
at 216-20.
at 221-29.

103 Center for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir.

2003).

104 Id. at 922.
105

Id. at 920.

106 Id. at 925-32.
107 Id. at 927-32.

108 Id. at 936.
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The trend of these cases seems relatively clear. Great deference is being given to the Executive Department in connection with steps taken by executive agencies in seeking to protect
national security. Where that deference will receive a check
has become a matter of pressing concern for those who view
such lack of judicial control as having grave public policy implications. Detroit Free Press, however, at least suggests a salutary "bright-line" to the effect that, where enforcement is
achieved through access to an adjudicative process, the normal
First Amendment issue will be resolved in favor of disclosure of
and access to the relevant information. Modern removal proceedings, although they have been held to be civil rather than
criminal in nature, clearly entail consequences which often
make criminal sanctions pale. It is for this reason that deportation statutes are to be strictly construed since they often involve
the draconian results such as banishment or exile. 10 9 The chief
exception to this emerging doctrine seems to be in the area of
"enemy combatants," which is discussed below.
V.

DUE PROCESS CONCERNS: THE ISSUES OF SECRET
EVIDENCE AND THE MONITORING OF ATTORNEY/
CLIENT CONVERSATIONS

Section 235(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA") permits the use of secret evidence in the case of removing "arriving" non-citizens. 1 10 INA § 240(b)(4)(B) further permits the use of secret evidence both in connection with opposing
an alien's admission to the United States, and to defeat an application for lasting immigration relief (e.g., political asylum).
Prior to September 11, courts had struck down the use of "secret
evidence" in cases where the removal of alleged terrorists was
at issue."'
This trend continues despite the events of September 11
and the new judicial conservatism which those events helped to
create. In Singh v. INS, an immigration judge had denied a foreign national's application for asylum on the basis of "factual
109 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).

110 INA § 235(b).
111 See, e.g., STEVEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
126 (Pocket Part, 3d ed. 2002), and authorities cited therein.
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inferences from classified evidence." ' 2 The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed this ruling.1 1 3 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit ordered the INS to produce all classified materials presented to the Immigration Judge." 4 The court reasoned
that it could not perform its statutory function of review unless
these materials were made available." 5 Due process thus required in camera inspection as an aspect of judicial review.
Another rather alarming development allowed the Attorney-General to monitor attorney-client conversations, when the
head of a qualifying agency has "reasonable suspicion" to believe that the communications are being used to further terrorist acts. Specifically, the relevant Order provides:
In any case where the Attorney-General specifically so orders,
based on information from the head of a federal law enforcement
or intelligence agency that reasonable suspicion exists to believe
that a particular inmate may use communications with attorneys
or their agents to further or facilitate acts of terrorism, the Director... shall ...provide appropriate procedures for the monitoring
or review of communications between that inmate and attorneys
or attorneys' agents who are traditionally covered by the attorneyclient privilege, for the purpose of deterring future acts that could
result in death or serious bodily injury to person, or substantial
damage to property that would entail the risk of death or serious
16
bodily injury to persons.'
The regulation contains some review procedures that ameliorate its otherwise chilling thrust. Among these are the existence of a "privilege team," which is to remain separate from the
investigation, and which would "minimize" the intrusion into
privileged material." 7 Notwithstanding this feature and the requirement that there be advance notice to the inmate and the
attorney, the American Bar Association ("ABA") substantively
criticized the regulatory regime as a derogation of existing standards.1 18 The ABA noted that a court order could always be obtained to monitor such conversations upon a showing of
112

Singh v. I.N.S., 328 F.3d 1205, 1206 (9th Cir. 2003).

113

Id.

114

Id.
Id.
66 Fed. Reg. 55,062, 55,066 (Oct. 31, 2001), amending 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d).
Id.

115
116
117

118 Id.

at 55,066.

21

PACE INT'L L. REV.

[Vol. 16:65

probable cause, since embarking upon a criminal venture is not
a proper aspect of the attorney-client relationship. 119 The new
by subapproach significantly modifies that salutary standard
120
cause."
"probable
for
suspicion"
stituting "reasonable
VI.

USE OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS

Perhaps nowhere is the clash between domestic and international human rights law and the rights of aliens been brought
more forcefully into play than in President Bush's Military Order proposing the use of "military commissions" to try aliens
suspected of involvement in terrorist acts.' 2 ' The deployment of
these commissions would effectively remove the trial of suspects
from the constitutional protections of U.S. courts. The "commisthe executive
sions" base their authority to try such cases on
122
power of the president as commander in chief.
The case law interpreting the scope of the President's
power to establish such commissions has been, from the point of
view of the detainees, not promising. Al Odah v. United
States 23 involved essentially two actions in which the petitioners, non-citizens detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, challenged the conditions of their confinement. The petitioners
sought, in one case, more humanitarian treatment including access to their families and, in the other, actual release from confinement. 24 The District Court for the District of Columbia
treated both cases as involving petitions for writ of habeas
corpus. The court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the
cases, because the petitioners were non-citizens seeking relief
25
from outside the jurisdictional confines of the United States.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed this
119 Id.
120

See generally LEGOMSKY, supra note 111, at 104.

See Military Order regarding "Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism," 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
The Order relates to non-citizens whom the President has reason to believe are: (a)
present or former members of al Qaeda; (b) involved in activities with adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, its national security, economy, or foreign
policy; or (c) persons who may have harbored any of the foregoing individuals. Id.
§ 2(a)(1)(i-iii).
121

122

Id.

123
124

Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1136.

125

Id.
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ruling with minor modification. 12 6 Relying on the authority of
Johnson v. Eisentrager,127 the court found that Fifth Amendment rights do not extend to aliens who are outside the sover128
eign territory of the United States.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 129 the Fourth Circuit upheld the
right of a United States citizen to petition for a writ of habeas
corpus with respect to his detention in the United States as an
"enemy combatant," but determined that the scope of judicial
review was limited. 130 Among other things, the Hamdi court
ruled that a government affidavit certifying that the petitioner
had been captured in a combat zone during the recent Afghan
conflict was sufficient to establish his status as an "enemy combatant." 13 1 Having found that the petitioner was not entitled to
challenge the underlying facts of the government affidavit, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that Hamdi's detention was proper.13 2
The court relied, in this respect, on an oft-cited case, Ex Parte
Quirin 133 to the effect that,
[olne who takes up arms against the United States in a foreign
theater of war, regardless of his citizenship, may properly be designated an enemy combatant and treated as such. The privilege
of citizenship entitles Hamdi to a limited judicial inquiry into his
detention, but only to determine its legality under the war powers
of the political branches.' 3 4
Id. at 1134.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) ("We are cited to no instance
where a court, in this or any other country where the writ [of habeas corpus] is
known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant time and in
no stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction. Nothing in the
text of the Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything in our statutes").
128 Id. at 1137. The Supreme Court has now granted certiorari in connection
with the Al Odah case limited to the following question: "Whether United States
courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of detention of foreign
nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the
Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba." Al Odah v. United States, 124 S.Ct. 534 (2003)
(mem.). See also Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Hear Case of Detaineesat Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at Al.
129 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003).
130 Id. at 450.
131 Id. at 461.
132 Id. at 476.
133 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
134Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 475.
126
127
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In a significant aspect of its ruling, the circuit court held
that petitioner could draw no comfort from the fact that Article
5 of Geneva Convention III, relative to prisoners of war, requires that there be a determination of "enemy combatant" status before confinement becomes appropriate.135 Petitioner
stressed the difference between "lawful" and "unlawful" combatants central to the Geneva Conventions as a whole. 13 6 In response to this argument, the circuit court determined that both
classes are subject to confinement during the pendency of
37
hostilities.1
Ominously, however, the appeals court also found that the
Geneva Conventions are not self-executing. 138 This legal conclusion raises grave implications for the future of those facing trial
under President Bush's Military Order. 139 For it is not only article 5 which is cast in doubt by the court's ruling but the entire
body of the Conventions, including those provisions which establish standards of humane treatment for prisoners of war,
and which set forth civilized rules of procedure governing the
trial of those detained during armed conflict. The non-self executing nature of the Conventions remarked upon by the court,
moreover, is completely at odds with the modern doctrine that
certain fundamental norms codified in the Geneva Conventions
(including those relating to "due process") are rules of customary law and, in effect, jus cogens. This means that no derogation from these provisions is permissible, so long as the
international community of States as a whole does not develop a
new rule. Therefore, the norms of the Geneva Conventions do
not require implementation through statutory enactment, but
1 40
acquire binding effect through their status as customary law.
The use of "military commissions" for the purposes of trying
those believed to be responsible for acts of terrorism against the
135 Id. at 468 (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135).
136 Id. at 469.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 468.
139 It should be noted that Hamdi was not being detained under President
Bush's Order, but pursuant to the President's war powers as detailed in Article II,
Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 470-72.
140 See, e.g., THEODOR. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HuMANTARiAN NORMS AS

CUSTOMARY LAW 74 (1989).
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United States and its citizens raises grave questions under both
domestic and international law. The Bar Association of the City
of New York has now issued a very lucid and forceful report
which explores some of these questions. 141 Among other things,
the Report concludes that the Quirin case does not provide legal
authority for the trial of "harboring" suspects in military commissions. 142 Moreover, the indefinite detention of aliens, which
the Military Order seems to permit, is clearly unconstitutional,
at least as applied to those aliens held in the jurisdiction of the
United States. This is particularly the case since Congress has
deemed it appropriate to legislate in this area. Through the
USA PATRIOT Act, Congress has amended INA § 236 to provide that those who are detained as terrorist suspects must be
criminally charged or placed in removal proceedings within
seven days following the commencement of detention, unless
the President certifies that release would endanger the national
security of the United States. 143 Accordingly, this is an area
where the President is on extremely weak constitutional ground
concerning his independent powers, since he is acting in an area
in which Congress has already expressed certain preferred

policies.144
The executive branch is unquestionably subject to certain
procedural rules pursuant both to treaty law and to legislative
enactment which the presidential order, standing alone, is not
effective to modify.14 5 Relevant statutory provisions can be
found in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 14 6 while U.S. international obligations are largely codified in the Geneva Con141 Committee on Military Affairs and Justice of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, Inter Arma Silent Leges: In Times of Armed Conflict Should
the Laws be Silent? A Report on the President's Military Order of November 13,
2001 Regarding "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism,"57 THE RECORD 39 (2002) [hereinafter Committee Report]
(arguing that precedent supports use of military commissions within "prototypical
declared war between nations involving members of the armed forces of an enemy
state" but urging "the greatest caution in extending the laws of war to situations
not traditionally contemplated").
142 Id. at 54, 60-61.
143 Id. at 60-62 (discussing § 412 of the USA Patriot Act).
144 Id. at 62-63 (discussing Justice Robert Jackson's concurring opinion in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (The Steel
Seizure Case)).
145 Id.
146 10 U.S.C.A. § 821 (1956).
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ventions of August 12, 1949.147 A preferred forum would
therefore be one in which the procedural requirements of U.S.
constitutional law, U.S. statutory law, and international humanitarian law would be observed. 148 Such a preferred tribunal
would be:
" An international tribunal such as the one established by the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;
* A federal district court; or
" A court martial empanelled under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. 149
Many individuals who are exposed to criminal charges undoubtedly were taken in the field during an open military engagement. Where it appears that such individuals have done
nothing more than to engage in the lawful exercise of military
force (i.e., they have only participated in using force against
lawful military objects, and not against civilians), they should
147 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are (1) Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, in force Oct.
21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; (2) Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked members of
Armed Forces at Sea, in force Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. 3363, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; (3) Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, in force
Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; and (4) Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, in force Oct. 21,
1950, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. See also Protocol Additional I
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (relating to protection of victims of international armed conflict), in force Dec. 7, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/32/144/Annex I (1977),
reprintedin 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional II to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflict), in force Dec. 7, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/32/144/Annex 11 (1977),
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II].
148 Many commentators rely on the Quirin case, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), which upheld the use of military commissions to try certain Nazi saboteurs who landed in
the U.S. and then proceeded inland in civilian clothing in violation of the laws of
war. This case arguably has been superseded by two developments: by the passage
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000) and by the
United States becoming a party to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and
of Protocol I, supra note 147 (both dealing with the laws of war applicable to international armed conflict). Executive action standing alone would not be sufficient to
support the constitutionality of military commissions which are not subject to the
kinds of procedural safeguards which Congress has specifically endorsed. Moreover, as a matter of public policy, the executive branch should refrain from adopting
procedures which are hostile to customary norms which are codified in a treaty to
which the United States is a party.
149 See Committee Report, supra note 141, at 74-78.
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be entitled to the full benefits of "prisoner of war" status. 150
This would include the right to be returned to their home states
after hostilities have come to an end 15 ' and the right not to have
certain types of information extracted from them. 152 The war in
Afghanistan constitutes a colorable international armed conflict
within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I
thereto. 53 The administration repeatedly raises doubts regarding the status of the belligerents, maintaining the view that
members of al Qaeda are "unlawful combatants." 1 54 It should be
noted, however, that the scope of Convention III (relating to
Prisoners of War) remains comparatively liberal. The essential
requirements of Convention III are that the "combatant" must
act under an organized command; carry his or her arms openly;
have a distinctive sign recognized at a distance; and conduct
military operations in conformity with the requirements of the
laws of war.' 55
Importantly, the commentary to the Conventions indicates
that parties to the Conventions (including the United States)
150 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
art. 4(B)(2), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention III]. Importantly, the President has concluded that, whereas the situation of the Taliban combatants may be considered as governed by Geneva Convention III, members of al Qaeda are not so covered. See generally Daryl A. Mundis,
The Use of Military Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist
Acts, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 320, 325 (2002). Irrespective of whether or not this view is
correct, it remains clear that this determination should be made by a "competent
tribunal" under article 5 of Geneva Convention III, and not by the President of the
United States.
151 Geneva Convention III, supra note 150, art. 118.
152 Id. art. 17.
153 See Lawrence Azubuike, Status of Taliban and Al Qaeda Soldiers:Another
Viewpoint, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 127, 143 (2003). Even though neither the United
States nor Afghanistan have ratified Protocol I, they would be bound by the fundamental principles of that Protocol as reflective of general international customary
law. See generally Vincent Chetail, The FundamentalPrinciples of Humanitarian
Law Through the Case Law of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 21(3) REFUGEE
SURVEY QUARTERLY 199 (2002). Afghanistan and the United States, moreover, remain parties to the Geneva Conventions. See, e.g., Knut Dormann, The legal Situation of "Unlawful/ Unprivileged Combatants," 849 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE
RED CROss 45 (Mar. 2003) at http://www.icrc.orgIWeb/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/sectionreview_2003_849?OpenDocument (author focuses on the controversially debated question of whether "unlawful combatants" fall into the personal scope of
application of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949).
154 See generally Mundis, supra note 150, at 320.
155 See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 150, arts. 4(2)(a)-(d).
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should comply with its terms, even though there may be doubts
as to the status of the other party to the conflict. 15 6 The procedural rules of the Conventions mirror those in U.S. domestic
law regarding the rights of criminal defendants. 157 It should be
mentioned that, even if an individual is shown not to have engaged in lawful military force but to have committed what the
Conventions call a "grave breach" (i.e., conspired to engage in a
"crime against humanity" or an act of genocide, or the unlawful
slaying of a civilian), this would not cause a "jurisdictional
lapse." 5 1 Such an individual could still be tried for the offense
by a court of competent jurisdiction established under the Geneva Conventions. 5 9 Such offenses would unquestionably embrace engaging in a conspiracy to commit the September 11
atrocities.
The United States is bound by the Geneva Conventions
with regard to those who are taken into custody during an international war.' 6 0 The holding of the Hamdi case that the Geneva Conventions are not self-executing is not persuasive,
particularly in light of the fact that the Conventions represent
customary law (and in may instances jus cogens), and that such
Id. arts. 99-108.
Id. Application of these rules would virtually mandate that those detained
pursuant to the Military Order be tried by court-martial "employing the applicable
procedural and evidentiary rules." Mundis, supra note 150, at 327. As one article
on the subject has noted:
First, Court Martial Rule 1004 sets forth the prerequisites for the death
penalty to be adjudged. This rule requires, inter alia, the concurrence of
all members of the court martial present at the time of the voting. Second,
RCM 921(c)(2)(B) sets forth the applicable rules with respect to voting on
guilt or innocence and provides that at least two thirds of the court-martial present must vote to convict in order to make the verdict lawful.
Moreover, if the sentence imposed exceeds ten years' imprisonment,
three-fourths of the court-martial members present must vote for that
sentence. Third, members of the U.S. armed forces are guaranteed the
right of appeal right up to and including review by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Fourth, trial by court-martial is generally an open proceeding, subject to very limited exceptions. Fifth, the accused before a court-martial
have the right to select civilian defense counsel of their choice.
Id. (emphasis in original).
158 Id. at 322-28.
159 Id. Even if convicted, POW's continue to benefit from the protections of the
Conventions. Geneva Convention III, supra note 150, art. 85. But see Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (stating that the power of the military to exercise
jurisdiction over members of armed forces is well established). Id. at 786.
160 See Mundis, supra note 150, at 325.
156

157
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customary norms do not require implementation to have primacy and direct effect. 16 1 One of the most essential principles of
international humanitarian law, moreover, is that signatory
States should both respect and assure respect for the Conventions in all circumstances. 1 62 This principle was held to be ajus
cogens norm by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Judgment, 6 3 and is thus universal and non-derogable. The
government's attempt to evade "Prisoner of War" status for
those taken on the field in open international conflict is an obvious lack of conformity to the requirements of the Geneva
Conventions.
VII.

CRIMINAL ALIENS AND THE PROBLEM OF
FACTO LAWS

Ex POST

Prior to the 1996 legislation, lawful permanent residents
had access to a broad discretionary waiver per § 212(c) of the
statute. 6 4 If granted, the waiver was effective to relieve the
alien of the consequences of certain grave acts which would otherwise give rise to inadmissibility under the statute, including
some serious criminal convictions.' 6 5 In a series of statutes, beginning with the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act ("AEDPA") 166 and later with the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"),' 67 Congress
acted first to delimit § 212(c) relief and ultimately to replace it
with a new, much more restricted remedy called Cancellation of
Removal, Part A.' 68 Among other things, Cancellation of Removal, Part A would not waive crimes classified as "aggravated
felonies," such as narcotic distribution convictions and alien
smuggling.169
161 See Karen Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of
Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 411 (1989).
162 Geneva Convention III, supra note 150, art. 1.
163 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 101 (June 27) [hereinafter NicaraguaJudgment].
164 I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).

165 Id. at 295.

Id. at 289.
Id. at 289.
168 INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2000).
169 INA § 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2000).
166
167
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What would happen to those aliens who had either been
placed in proceedings before the legislation, or who had filed
claims prior to its effective date? The government answered
that question in an administrative decision called Matter of
Soriano, in which it determined that such residents were not
eligible to apply for § 212(c) relief since the legislation had retrospective effect.170 The government's determination was almost uniformly rejected in the federal appellate courts,
including the Second Circuit. 171 Ensuing regulations sought to
codify the jurisprudence emerging in the circuit court
72
opinions.1
The remaining issue was the availability of relief for aliens
facing removal proceedings under the new statute (IIRIRA)
with criminal convictions predating passage of the legislation.
Could an individual in removal proceedings who would other170 In re Soriano, 21 I. & N. Dec. 516 (BIA 1996), the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) ruled that AEDPA's bar on discretionary relief should not apply
retroactively to those who had petitioned for such relief before AEDPA's effective
date. 21 I. & N. Dec. at 519-20. The Attorney General reversed the BIA and issued
an opinion concluding that AEDPA should be applied retroactively to all pending
cases. 21 I. & N. Dec. 533 (Op. Att'y Gen. Feb. 21, 1997). This interpretation was
ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court in I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323-26
(2001).
171 For a history, see LEGOMSKY, supra note 111, at 577. A decision which is
worthy of note is Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), affirmed sub
nom. Henderson v. I.N.S., 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998), in which the Hon. James
Weinstein wrote a pioneering opinion in this area. Among other things, the court
found that Congress had not been clear as to whether the new law (AEDPA) was to
have retrospective effect. Judge Weinstein ruled that AEDPA was not to be given
retrospective reach in this instance. The court adopted as the basis for its decision
the standard rule that, wherever possible, U.S. statutory law should be construed
harmoniously with general international law, which forms a part of the common
law. The court then set out in an elaborate section of the opinion an analysis of the
case law arising under articles 8 and 11 of the European Convention of Human
Rights which had been construed by the European Court of Human Rights to preclude the refoulement (return) of aliens without a hearing as to the impact which
such removal would have on family members of the alien who were nationals of the
home State. Judge Weinstein noted that such removal, under the Strasbourg jurisprudence, would not be ordered unless proportional to the State's interest in maintaining its own security: specifically, the hardship to the family members would
have to be found not to outweigh legitimate national security concerns for removal
to be appropriate. Judge Weinstein found that the Strasbourg jurisprudence was
representative of the state of customary international law, and that U.S. law
would not be in conformity with general international standards if given retrospective effect.
172 66 Fed. Reg. 6,436, 6,446 (Jan. 22, 2001).
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wise have to seek the more restrictive relief (Cancellation of Removal) under IIRIRA apply for a waiver under § 212(c)? The
Supreme Court has ruled that such an individual might apply,
provided that the conviction was the result of a plea bargain
and the alien would have been eligible for § 212(c) relief at the
73
time the conviction was entered.'
Issues relating to the fairness of applying the "aggravated
felony" bar retrospectively have clearly stirred the same kinds
of judicial concerns as have arisen over mandatory and indefinite detention. The decision Beharry v. Reno,17 4 handed down
in New York by a federal judge who was instrumental in crafting § 212 relief prior to either AEDPA or IIRIRA, illustrates
forcefully the continuing containment of the "plenary power" at
the hands of the federal courts. Although the decision was recently reversed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the appeals court based its ruling only on the petitioner's failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, thus leaving unaffected much
175
of the District Court's rationale for its ruling.
Beharry was a long-term resident of the United States who
had entered the country at the age of seven in 1982.176 In November 1996, Beharry was convicted of robbery. 17 7 Although
that crime was an "aggravated felony" at the time of conviction,
it would not have been one at the time the crime was committed. 7 8 The alien also found himself barred from a generic
waiver provided by the statute (§ 212(h)), in that Congress deliberately exempted lawful permanent residents from that
waiver (in an effort to penalize them) if they had been convicted
79
of an "aggravated felony."
In Beharry, the court, through Judge Weinstein, found that
lawful permanent residents would not be precluded from applying for the broader waiver contained in § 212(h), because the act
I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 290 (2001).
Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 592 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003).
176 Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 586.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 588. The reason is that under the Cancellation of Removal Act, a
sentence of imprisonment of more than one year is an "aggravated felony," but
§ 212(c) required a sentence of more than five years imprisonment for an offense to
be characterized as an "aggravated felony."
179 Id. at 592.
173

174
175
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giving rise to the conviction took place prior to the effective date
of IIRIRA.18 ° What is important is not the substantive result
reached by Judge Weinstein, but rather the methodology by
which he reached it.
Judge Weinstein found that denying lawful permanent residents the opportunity to show the severe hardship on family
members by virtue of the alien's removal was contrary to basic
tenets of both customary international law and of treaty law.1 8 1
The District Court determined that the Convention on the
Rights of the Child,1 8 2 although not ratified by the United
States, represented customary law and that, in the absence of
an express contrary provision in U.S. statutory law, the custom183
ary rule should govern.
The District Court also found that barring lawful residents
with aggravated felony convictions from making INA § 212(h)
applications ran counter to U.S. obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR").1 8 4 That
instrument "prevents a nation from separating families in a
manner that, in accordance with its domestic law, is nonetheless unreasonable and in conflict with underlying provisions of
the ICCPR." 1 5 The court noted that the ICCPR had been characterized by the U.S. Senate as non-self-executing.' 8 6 Nonetheless, non-self-executing treaties had been used by the courts for
a variety of purposes, including establishing the state of customary international law.18 7 In this case, there could be no
doubt but that the ICCPR's preclusion against returning longterm residents without a hearing concerning the impact on re180 Id.
181 Id.

at 603.
at 604.

182 Id. at 600, 604. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted 20 Nov.
1989, entered into force 2 Sept. 1990, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989)
[hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child].
183 Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 600, 604.
184 Id. at 604. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16
Dec. 1966, entered into force 23 Mar. 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 ILM 368 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR]

(establishing the right of all persons to a fair and public hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law in the determination of
criminal charges or of rights and obligations in any suit at law).
185 Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 595, 603.
186 Id. at 603.
187 Id. at 604.
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maining family members violated essential provisions of customary law.18 8
In short, the District Court adopted general international
law, not to abrogate an existing U.S. statute, but to clarify it. It
is the responsibility of U.S. tribunals to read a statute, wherever possible, so as to render it consistent with U.S. international obligations.18 9 Judge Weinstein's decision does this
admirably.
The policy underpinnings for such an approach are also
spelled out with precision by the court. As has often been said,
the United States cannot expect to reap the benefits of internationally recognized human rights without itself being willing to
188 Id. at 603-04. In an earlier decision Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp 130
(E.D.N.Y. 1997), the same judge had found that giving retrospective reading to
AEDPA violated the customary norm that family members of the alien be provided
an opportunity to give evidence concerning the hardship which the alien's removal
would entail as to them. The opinion noted that, under customary law, such hardship should be balanced with the security needs of the home state. Id. at 152. A
leading case on this question is Berrehab v. Netherlands (A/138): (1989) 11
E.H.R.R. 322, where the European Court of Justice held:
As to the aim pursued, it must be emphasized that the instant case did
not concern an alien seeking admission to the Netherlands for the first
time but a person who had already lawfully lived there for several years,
who had a home and a job there, and against whom the Government did
not claim to have any complaint. Furthermore, Mr. Berrehab already had
real family ties there - he had married a Dutch woman, and a child had
been born of the marriage.
As to the extent of the interference, it is to be noted that there had been
very close ties between Mr. Beherrab and his daughter for several years
and that the refusal of an independent residence permit and the ensuing
expulsion threatened to break those ties. That effect of the interference in
issue was the more serious as Rebecca needed to remain in contact with
her father, seeing especially that she was very young.
Having regard to these particularcircumstances, the Court considers that
a proper balance was not achieved between the interests involved and that
there was therefore a disproportion between the means employed and the
legitimate aim pursued. That being so, the Court cannot consider the disputed measures as being necessary in a democratic society. It thus concludes that there was a violation of Article 8.
Id. para. 29 (emphasis added). This decision is abstracted in GILLES DUTERTRE &
JAKOB VAN DER VELDE, KEY EXTRACTS FROM A SELECTION OF JUDGMENTS OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF

HuMAN

RIGHTS AND DECISIONS AND REPORTS OF THE EURO-

110-11 (1999).
189 Murray v. Charming Besty, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (holding that a statute

PEAN COMMISSION OF HuMAN RIGHTS

must, whenever possible, be interpreted so as to avoid conflict with the "law of
nations").
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comply with them. 190 Courts should avoid a construction of existing statutes which would place the nation in violation of international law, since such rulings would embarrass the
executive in its conduct of foreign affairs. 191 The court concluded by noting that the foundation of the immigration power
was international law.' 92 This made application of international human rights doctrine especially appropriate with regard
1 93
to interpreting immigration statutes.
The government's apparent unwillingness to conform to its
international obligations is a further indication of its proclivity
to resolve questions relating to immigration and to aliens in a
manner that is outside the scope of international and domestic
legal protections. As Judge Weinstein noted, such an approach
in inconsistent with a rational world order and with the universe of human rights from which the United States, like other
sovereigns, would hope to benefit.

VIII.

ASYLUM SEEKERS

Expedited removal was introduced into our law in the 1996
legislation. 94 In broad outline, those who arrive with false documents or no documents are to be summarily removed without
a hearing. If the alien makes any one of three representations
(that she wishes to apply for asylum, that she fears persecution,
or that she has "concerns" about return), she is to be placed in a
"credible fear" interview. 19 5 In that interview, she must show a
"significant possibility" that she could make out a developed
asylum claim, or she will be returned forthwith to the country of
embarkation.19 6 During the pendency of that interview, the asylum seeker is to be detained. 9 7 The statute says nothing about
detention after the asylum seeker shows credible fear, but most
190 Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 601.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 598.
193
194
Act of
195
196

Id. at 601-02.
See generally Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 100 Stat. 3009 (1996) [hereinafter IIRIRA].
INA § 235(b)(1)(A).
INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii).

197 Id.
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INS District Directors have historically exercised their discre198
tion to keep the alien in detention.
Significant human rights issues are generated by virtue of
this statutory scheme. In the first place, it is contrary to international customary law to return without a hearing any alien to
the frontiers of a State where she will be persecuted, or to a
State which itself does not respect the right of non-return. 199
Such return is branded as "rejection at the frontier."20 0 Threshold questions exist with respect to what happens at the "secondary inspection," where the alien engages in her first
meaningful interview with the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") and must make one of the three representations sel
out above. There is no record with respect to this interview, and
efforts by the pro bono publico bar to gain access to the "secon20 1
dary inspection" have not yet met with broad success.
To what degree is there effective communication between
DHS front-line officers and otherwise qualifying asylum seekers, due to the absence of translators or other causes? To what
extent are those with a fear of persecution being returned at
this stage without any kind of meaningful interview in contravention of customary international law? At this point, we simply do not know. It is certain, however, that the environment of
comparative secrecy already surrounding "secondary inspection" is not likely to be relieved by the events of September 11.
A second level of concern relates to the continuing detention of asylum seekers after they have met the "significant possibility" standard. "Expedited removal" was an effort by the
United States to codify, to some degree, international custom20 2
ary law relating to the filing of "frivolous" asylum claims.
198 Nicholas J. Rizza, INS Detention: The Impact on Asylum Seekers, available
at http:/www.refugees.org/world/articles/ins-detention-n96_htm. There is no indication that this practice will change under the aegis of the Department of Home-

land Security.
199 Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by the High Commissioner), EC/SCP/
2 (Aug. 23, 1977), United Nations Refugee Agency, at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/

texis/vtx/home.
200 Id.
201 See Jaya Ramji, Legislating Away International Law: The Refugee Provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37
STAN. J. INT'L L. 117, 134, 140 (2001).

202 See Donald Kerwin, Looking for Asylum, Suffering in Detention, 28-WTR

Hum. RTs. 3, *3 (2001).
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States are permitted to return aliens summarily where they put
forward asylum claims which are "manifestly unfounded or
abusive." 20 3 Where an alien meets the "credible fear" standard,
however, such concerns should no longer gain currency. Detention which goes beyond the State's concerns in guarding itself
against spurious applications can no longer be defended as supported by a valid public interest; the State's justification in continuing detention evaporates.
Despite the elimination of the need to detain, asylum seekers meeting the credible fear standard continue to be confined
while their asylum applications are heard. The District Director's inclination to exercise discretion in granting parole in such
circumstances will certainly be inhibited by the September 11
events. Thus, even those asylum seekers who have a colorable
claim to international human rights protection will remain in
what is essentially a punitive system of detention.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
("UNHCR") has recognized the need for detention to meet some
standard of State necessity. 20 4 Detention which does not meet
this test will be viewed as a penalty in violation of the 1951
Convention on the Status of Refugees. 20 5 According to UNHCR,
detention becomes justified in only four situations:
* verification of identity;
* determination of the elements upon which the claim to refugee
status is based;
* cases in which refugees or asylum seekers have destroyed
travel or identity documents in order to mislead the authorities; or
20 6
* protection of national security or public order.
Detaining the individual beyond the point at which these criteria are satisfied, it is submitted, constitutes a "penalty" within
the meaning of Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, and thus
contravenes international customary law.
See Ramji, supra note 201, at 125.
This UN agency is responsible for international refugee resettlement and
for promulgating guidelines on the normative standards of refugee law. See
UNHCR Guidelines on Detention of Asylum Seekers, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, at http://www.rcmvs.org/investigacion/Asylum.htm (last
visited May 6, 2004) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines].
203
204

205 Id.

206 UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 204, Guideline 3.
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Urging these concerns and others, groups such as the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights have sought to repeal the
current statutory scheme relating to expedited removal. 20 7 The
events of September 11, however, have imposed a temporary
halt to such efforts and the current system is likely to be with
us for some time. That is regrettable in light of the grave
human rights implications it raises.
It must also be noted that judicial control of the expedited
removal process has been totally ineffectual. This is largely because Congress provided for a "one-time systemic challenge" to
expedited removal, a challenge which failed in American Immigration Lawyers Ass'n v. Reno. 20 8 The failure of the case can
generally be attributed to the court's unwillingness to entertain
arguments that the statutory scheme offended general interna20 9
tional law.
Moreover, recent administrative jurisprudence suggests
that the situation is deteriorating rather than improving. A recent decision by the Attorney General ("AG") reveals that the
DHS's detention policy relative to asylum seekers is expanding
beyond the area of "expedited removal." In Matter of D-J-, the
AG overturned as unwarranted the release on bond of a Haitian
asylum seeker who had attempted to reach U.S. shores by boat
and who had been apprehended onshore. 2 10 Importantly, both
the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals
had found that the respondent did not pose a flight risk or a
threat to the community. 2 1 ' Despite these findings, and without
really overturning them, the AG determined that bond was not
appropriate in these circumstances.212
The opinion noted that there was no constitutional right to
21 3
an individualized bond hearing for inadmissible non-citizens.
The AG then went on to rule that the public policy considerations raised by the INS on appeal merited overturning the asy207 See, Slamming "The Golden Door": A Year of Expedited Removal, Humans
Rights First, at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/golden.htm
(last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
208 Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n v. Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 1998).
209 Id. at 52.
210 Matter of D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572 (A.G. 2003).
211 Id. at 581.
212 Id. at 574.
213 Id. at 583.
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lum seeker's release on bond. 214 These considerations are
worth noting because they were entirely divorced from the individual merits of the bond request. Primarily, the AG ruled that
attempted entry without admission would encourage other noncitizens to essay the same type of unlawful landing thereby promoting a "mass influx." 215 He also found that granting release
on bond would promote evasion of an orderly inspection and admissions process. 216 The national security implications of this
finding were deemed persuasive. 217 Because the public policy
foundations of the AG's ruling ignore individualized consideration of the asylum seeker's bond request, potentially large classes of non-citizens will now be added to the growing corpus of
detained aliens seeking international human rights protection.
Moreover, it should be noted that the respondent's argument in the Matter of D-J- that his detention violated general
international law was not addressed. The AG simply ruled that
the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees was not self-executing. 218 This is yet another example of
international protections being trumped by the perceived overriding concerns of a national system.
IX.

EVALUATION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
DETENTION POLICY -

Immediately after the September 11 attacks, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") initiated one of its most ambitious investigations into the causes of the disaster. The inquiry,
known formally as the Pentagon/World Towers Bombing Investigation ("PENTTBOM"), called for the detention of both those
suspected of involvement with the attacks and those thought to
have useful information regarding them. 219 Countless individuals who did not fall into either of the above categories, but who
214 Id. at 579.
215 See Matter of D-J-, supra note 210, at 580.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 579-80.
218 Id. at 584 n.8.
219 See Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, The September 11
Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in
Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks, ch. 10 (June 2003),
at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/speciall03-06/ [hereinafter IG Report].
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were vulnerable because of "immigration violations," fell subject

220
to the government's dragnet and were detained.
On June 2, 2003, the Inspector General's Office issued a report substantially criticizing the mistreatment of aliens by federal agencies following the September 11 attacks. 22 1 The report
concluded that the FBI failed to distinguish between aliens who
were legitimately suspected of terrorism, and those who, at
most, would have been culpable of essentially innocuous immigration violations. 22 2 Many aliens who had been detained did
not receive a Notice to Appear (the relevant charging document)
within the normally required forty-eight hours, and often had to
2 23
wait a month to be apprised of the charges against them.
Many of those detained were confined under highly restrictive conditions, usually based on the uninformed opinion of the
FBI regarding the non-citizen's connection to terrorism. 2 24 Such
restrictive conditions could consist of a "'lock-down' for at least
23 hours a day; escort procedures that included a 'four-man
hold' with handcuffs, leg irons, and heavy chains any time the
detainees were moved outside their cells; and a limit of one telephone call per week and one social call per month." 225 As a result of these procedures, many detainees were unable to
communicate with counsel and thus gain legal representation. 226 Moreover, the family and friends of the detainees, and
even law enforcement officials, often were wholly ignorant as to
where the detainees were being held. 22 7 And, at some detention
facilities, the detainees were subjected to harassment, both by
correctional officials and by the prison population with whom
2 28
the they were housed.
Despite the lengthy delays associated with obtaining clearances, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") followed a policy of
"no bond" during this time period. 2 2 9 Apparently, disputes
220

Id. ch. 4.

221 See generally id.
222
223

Id. ch. 10.
Id. ch. 7, III, C.
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Id. ch. 7, IV, C-D.
Id. ch. 5, II.
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emerged between the FBI and the INS over the lawfulness of
continuing detention after the alien had received a grant of voluntary departure or a final order of removal, where the alien
was willing and able to leave the country but had not received a
"clearance" from the FBI. 23 o It was not until January 2002 that
the DOJ accepted that removal was appropriate for these
23
aliens. 1
These conditions clearly reflect a lack of proportionality between means and ends with regard to the ongoing struggle
against terrorism. Asylum seekers searching for surrogate international protection in U.S. courts often face dragnets which
ensnare the innocent as well as the guilty. As to those who
have no connection with the wrongdoing, this is clearly a form
of persecution. Mistreatment which is excessive, and not connected to a criminal prosecution, will give rise to a finding of
persecution in the statutory sense.232
One may earnestly hope that this situation will improve
and that the current conduct of U.S. officials towards non-citizens arising out of the September 11 attacks does not lead to
further international criticism of U.S. detention policies. The
law of human rights is predicated on a reasonable link between
State action and a defined public interest. Where that link cannot be made out, State action will be viewed as an illegitimate
infringement of a protected interest. 2 33 Courts must intervene,
where appropriate, to assure that the balance between individual freedom and collective security is respected. However, the
Id. ch. 5, III, D.
Id. ch. 6.
In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 493 (1996).
For an excellent discussion of this principle in the refugee context, see Walter Kalin, Refugees and Civil Wars: Only a Matter of Interpretation,3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 435, 450 (1991):
In determining whether State measures in a civil war situation have a
legitimate military character, or whether they constitute political persecution, the German Federal Constitutional Court has followed exactly the
same approach as is used by international Courts and similar organs in
international human rights and economic law. Limitations of rights of individuals are only legitimate if they serve a legitimategoal and if, in their
actual extent, they do not go further than necessary in order to achieve that
goal. If either they do not in fact serve the invoked interest or are disproportionate, they constitute political, racial or religious persecution if they
take place in the context of a political, ethnic or religious conflict. (Emphasis in original).
230
231
232
233
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record so far, with respect to the courts' willingness to do this, is

mixed.
X.

CONCLUSION AND ASSESSMENT

Many of the problems associated with the plenary power
derive from its origins in international law. Indeed, in the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Supreme Court laid great stress on the
international law foundations of the immigration power, and on
the inherent power of States to defend its borders if it were to be
a sovereign amongst sovereigns - 23 4a State acting within an international community of States.
It was a companion doctrine to this outlook that the immigration power would be comparatively unrestricted. If a sovereign were to be sovereign, it must not be subject to constraint.
Any restraints that may exist must flow from ethical concerns
and voluntary acts of grace which the sovereign, in its discretion, may exercise from time to time. This was largely the view
of Sir John Austin who maintained that there could really be no
such thing as international law because all law contemplated
the power to enforce a sanction. 2 35 Since that power was a quintessential attribute of sovereignty, and since no sovereign could
itself be subject to sanction without loosing its character as sovereign, "international law" was an oxymoron. 23 6 What we call
"international law" is really a body of ethical rules which the
23 7
State may or may not accept.
This view is at odds with modern jurisprudence, both at the
international and at the municipal level. Among British scholars, it has long been held that the old doctrine of parliamentary
omni-competence (under which parliament is absolutely unfettered with regard to its power to legislate) is being gradually
modified by the view that ethical concerns are binding on the
legislator in his or her adoption of dispositive norms. 238 In international law, the old "dualistic" view that States can displace
otherwise valid international obligations by countervailing leg234 Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604-06;

LEGOMSKY,

supra note 111, at

17.
235
236
237
238

HANBuRY & D.C.M. YARDLEY, ENGLISH COURTS OF LAW 5-9 (5th ed. 1979).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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islation is giving way to a "monistic" interpretation of international law under which States cannot set aside otherwise valid
international obligations.239
Emerging restrictions on sovereignty can also be seen in
the modern law of international human rights. 'As we have
seen, such rights have been explicitly relied on by American
judges, such as Judge Weinstein, to circumscribe the scope of
the "plenary power." States are no longer the sole subject of international law, since individuals and groups are now perceived
as enjoying rights directly under regional and universal human
rights instruments as well as customary law. Because of the
emerging notion of jus cogens and of obligations erga omnes
(universal rights which cannot be derogated from by States and
which must be respected by them because of their indispensability to a viable international system), state discretion is being viewed as progressively more confined by the impact it has
on individuals and groups. 240
Sir Henry Maine, in his influential treatise Ancient Law,
analogized the development of international law to that of municipal law, maintaining that unchecked sovereignty was really
the equivalent of early customary codes which were based on
the unfettered powers of the pater familias.241 Just as municipal custom based on force had evolved into a complex system of
rights and duties based on a reason, so international custom
would eventually be assimilated into a fabric of rational
242
norms.
As Robert Jackson maintained in his opening statements at
Nuremberg, law is really the tribute which force pays to reason. 24 3 Recent developments in U.S. immigration law, as the
foregoing discussion hopefully shows, illustrate the dialectic between force and reason which is shaping our jurisprudence.
239 See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-34
(4th ed. 1990). This view has tended to manifest itself in the case law interpreting
the Treaty of Rome. See, e.g., Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1344
(N.D. Ga. 2002).
240 Cf. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5, 1970).
241 HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAw

LOR,

10-13 (1982).

Id. at 13 et seq.
Jackson's opening speech at Nuremberg is summarized in
THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 165-73 (1992).
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The most formidable checks to the "plenary power" were issued
only in 2001 with the advent of the Zadvydas and the St. Cyr
decisions. The natural influence of those cases was abruptly altered by the September 11 events. The dialectic continues, however, and the evolution which was spawned by the Supreme
Court in 2001 will, it is to be wished, continue in its course towards a regime of reason.
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